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TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 
By Stephen 1. Burr* 
INTRODUCTION 
"Man", Mark Twain said, "is the only animal that blushes. Or 
needs to.'" Part of the reason for such blushing could well be man's 
treatment of other animals. Man has viewed animals as objects 
which exist for his use. We train animals to do our bidding, and 
punish them when they are slow to behave as we desire. When we 
encounter animals we are unable to domesticate, we hunt them for 
food or sport, or if not suitable for those purposes, we ignore them. 
This use and abuse of animals has risen to new levels in the modern 
Western World. Our demand for meat and leather has required the 
development of more efficient techniques for exploitation of domes-
tic animals. 2 The explosion of scientific research, especially in the 
life sciences, has created an almost insatiable demand for research 
animals.3 By ignoring the needs of animals as we expand our indus-
trialized economy we have abused them in more subtle ways: habi-
tat destruction and pollution have had serious impacts on animal 
populations.4 
Arguably, the problem has resulted not so much from the inten-
tional mistreatment of animals, as from the way in which we have 
ignored animals and their needs. Early law dealing with animals 
reflected this lack of concern, affording animals almost no protec-
tion from man. However, recent events may change our attitudes. 
The effects of environmental degradation have taught us something 
about our interdependence with natural systems. This new model 
of natural interdependence has led scientists for the first time to 
look on animals as something close to man, something really worthy 
of study on that account alone. What these scientists have learned 
has firmly shaken traditional ideas about man's relationship with 
animals. However, the moral and legal implications of these new 
concepts have hardly been explored. This article will attempt to 
provide some insight into the scientific, moral and legal traditions 
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that have brought us to our present position. It will also attempt to 
suggest ways in which our legal system could respond to our rapidly 
changing ideas about animals. 
I. EARLY NON-LEGAL CONCEPTS OF ANIMALS IN WESTERN THOUGHT 
Our modern concepts of animals are rooted in the rationalist 
world of Plato and Aristotle. At a time when many cultures still 
clung to mythic concepts of man's relationship with the natural 
world, Plato was defining man in terms of his difference from that 
world. To him the human soul was the reasoning part of man's 
nature, somehow removed and above the chaos of the physical 
world.5 Aristotle applied this dualism to his studies of nature. He 
placed living things within a static hierarchy based on the contents 
of their souls. Plants were lowest, having merely nutritive souls.8 
Animals followed, having both nutritive and sensitive souls.7 At the 
apex was man, who possessed a rational soul, as well as nutritive 
and sensitive souls.8 To Aristotle man was separate from and above 
the natural world because he alone possessed the capacity to rea-
son.U 
Early Judaeo-Christian writings also separated man from the nat-
ural world: 
So God created man in his own image . . . and God said to them, 'Be 
fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have domain 
over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living 
thing that moves upon the earth.'IO 
Whether such a mandate, to fill and subdue the earth, is equally 
suited to a culture whose power to destroy that very earth has so 
vastly grown, is of course a serious question.l1 
While the ancient Greeks and Hebrews merely posited the superi-
ority of man, the Romans made the destructive potential of such a 
world view a reality. The Roman emperors brought back vast collec-
tions of exotic animals from conquered lands to establish personal 
menageries for their own entertainment. For the masses the sport 
of animal combat was created, pitting animals against each other 
or humans. 12 These entertainments were prototypes of some modern 
methods of animal exploitation, such as zoos and circus acts. 13 
While much of this organized abuse of animals disappeared with 
the fall of Rome, the rise of the Christian Church had little effect 
on the firmly imbedded conceptual dichotomy of man and animals. 
Christian theology, with its anthropocentric world view, reinforced 
the idea of human superiority. During this period the monotheistic 
tradition of the Church gradually replaced the widespread animistic 
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religions of Europe. 14 A key figure in the development of medieval 
Christian ontology was Thomas Aquinas. He synthesized the dual-
ism inherent in the story of the Creation and the Fall with the 
explicit dualism of Aristotle, positing a static hierarchy of creation 
not unlike Aristotle's, but with Christian terminology.15 Animals, to 
Aquinas, could not reason and therefore did not possess the equiva-
lent of the human soul. Kindness to animals was something to be 
encouraged, Aquinas felt, but primarily because kindness to ani-
mals might dispose men to exercise kindness toward each other. 16 
This approach provided the justification for much of the anti-
cruelty legislation that was to follow 600 years after Aquinas. When 
attacked as unconstitutional takings of property (the right to use an 
animal) without due process of law, those statutes were upheld as 
legitimate efforts by state governments to protect public morality. 17 
The implication of such an approach is that animals should be 
protected because allowing men to abuse them corrupts men's mor-
als, not because animals deserve to be protected in their own right. 
This is consistent with the Aristotelean - Thomistic conception of 
animals as completely different from and inferior to man. 
The Renaissance, Reformation and Scientific Revolution of the 15 
- 17th centuries greatly increased man's opinion of himself, but it 
did not significantly change his opinion of animals. They were 
viewed as intricate machines, cogs in the bigger machine set in 
motion by God. The leading exponent of this position was Rene 
Descartes. Animals, to Descartes, possessed no ability to reason. 
This assumption led him, as it had Aristotle and Aquinas, to con-
clude that animals had no equivalent of the human soul. 18 Because 
the ability to reason was so fundamental to Descartes' approach to 
the nature of man, he saw the lack of reason as more crippling to 
animals than even Aristotle had. He was unwilling to concede that 
animals, in the absence of reason, could even feel pain. iU It was this 
view of animals as unthinking, unfeeling beings that provided the 
moral setting in which an intellectual heir of Descartes could kick 
his dog to "hear the creaking of the machine. "20 
The philosophy of Descartes and his contemporaries probably 
represents the nadir of sensitivity toward animals in Western 
thought. Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries the study of ani-
mals as objects, things fit only for classification and dissection, 
flourished. Linnaeus distinguished and described thousands of 
species, placing each species in an eternal niche, never changing or 
developing.21 Throughout the Scientific Revolution and the Enlight-
enment, animals remained somewhere between plants and man on 
the ontological scale, a qualitatively different thing from man. 
208 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
By the end of the 18th century a reaction to the Enlightenment's 
atomistic model of creation had begun.22 A new generation of Ger-
man and English intellectuals enunciated a romantic view of the 
world. Their view was idealistic, emphasizing the organic nature of 
the world. 23 The Romantic reaction downplayed the importance of 
reason, and heralded a widespread return to orthodox religion. 
While "Romantics" sang the praises of Nature24, they in fact rarely 
followed the implications of their organic philosophy to their logical 
conclusions. While professing to see divinity in all creation, Blacks, 
Indians, women, children and animals were still treated as essen-
tially without rights.25 However, the positive effect of the Romantic 
movement was a reawakening of man's awareness of his interdepen-
dency with the natural world. This movement had an American 
equivalent in the transcendentalist movement among New England 
intellectuals. Men such as Emerson and Thoreau taught that the 
natural world deserved respect. To them, man's happiness rested 
largely on his ability to live harmoniously with the rest of Creation. 28 
It was against this intellectual background that anti-cruelty stat-
utes began to be passed in this country. 27 
However, it was not until the middle of the 19th century that the 
traditional view of animals was seriously questioned. The publica-
tion of Darwin's work on the interaction and evolution of species was 
a direct attack on the static hierarchy-of-creation model. To Dar-
win, animals and man were not created intact at some certain date 
in the past, and had not existed unchanging into the present. The 
Darwinian view of nature was of a dynamic, changing, interdepen-
dent web of creation,28 a shattering idea to people accustomed to 
thinking of themselves as sitting Godlike above the brute forces in 
the natural world. Darwin's work should have had real impact on 
our traditional moral and legal concepts of animals. The implication 
of his work was that animals and man are qualitatively similar, that 
"whatever was said of men could differ only in degree from what was 
said of other animals". 28 The ability to reason, to Darwin, was a 
product of selective pressures which might produce similar abilities 
in other creatures.3D 
Unfortunately, proponents of human superiority found in Dar-
win's "survival of the fittest" theory a substitute for Aristotle's ra-
tional soul theory of human superiority. Man, by his conquest of 
nature, had shown himself to be the "fittest" animal. His conquest 
was morally justified by the "law of the jungle", the need for self-
preservation. Man was not only better, or "fitter", than other crea-
tures, but his continued domination was proper, even necessary, to 
the proper functioning of the natural order. 31 
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Either because of such corruptions of Darwin's work, or because 
our culture was not yet ready to discard the Platonic world view, 
Darwin's work has not exerted real force in changing our moral and 
legal concepts of animals. Our early law concerning animals was 
erected on the moral foundation laid by Aristotle, Aquinas and Des-
cartes. Because we have resisted changing our moral position con-
cerning animals, we have not recognized the insufficiency of our 
legal conceptions concerning animals. As these ancient legal prin-
ciples are still dominant, an understanding of them is crucial to an 
understanding of the position of animals today. 
II. EARLY LEGAL CONCEPTS OF ANIMALS IN THE WESTERN WORLD 
A. The Common Law 
The common law developed two broad classes of animals, "domi-
tae" or "mansuetae naturae" and "ferae naturae", or domestic and 
wild animals respectively. 32 Domestic animals are those which have 
adjusted to life with man, and normally willingly remain under his 
control,33 These animals are the property of the owner, and in the 
absence of statutes controlling use, the owner may treat the animals 
as he wishes, including disposing of them. Cruelty by the owner to 
domestic animals is indictable at common law only when it is so 
publicly performed as to constitute a public nuisance.34 In addition, 
animals receive some indirect protection through property law. An 
individual who does not own animals, and abuses them so that their 
value as property is lessened, may be liable to their owner for tres-
pass or malicious mischief.35 However, at common law, animals 
have no rights in themselves, even to be protected from the inflic-
tion of completely unnecessary pain.38 Although this void has been 
partially filled today by anti-cruelty statutes, the absence of animal 
rights at common law is still significant. If a judge interprets a 
particular fact situation as being outside the reach of the anti-
cruelty statute, the animal is literally without protection. 
Wild animals are those which are incapable of being completely 
domesticated. 37 The ownership and control of wild animals present 
thorny legal questions. A well known property law casebook38 used 
by first year law students introduces them to the hoary world of the 
common law of property with the celebrated case of Pierson v. 
Post. 39 That 1805 decision by the New York Supreme Court turned 
on a dispute between two hunters in pursuit of a fox. The first 
hunter was engaged in what is commonly known as a fox hunt. 
Equipped with horses and hounds he was pursuing a fox on wild 
uninhabited land. The second hunter, seeing an opportunity, shot 
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the flushed fox and carried it off. The first hunter brought the action 
to recover damages for the loss of the fox. After consulting preced-
ents as far back as Justinian's Institutes the court resolved the 
dispute in favor of the second hunter, feeling that merely flushing 
an animal does not constitute sufficient control to amount to posses-
sion of the animal as property. This case illustrates much about 
what still is the common law concerning wild animals. In the ab-
sence of statutory restriction any person can take wild animals on 
public land and reduce them to his own possession, thus acquiring 
a qualified property right in the animal. 40 The right is qualified 
because if the animal escapes and reverts to its wild state, the 
property right is extinguished.41 Owners of land, however, have an 
exclusive right to take the wild animals on their land, except as that 
right is limited by the state}2 Thus, even on his own land an individ-
ual may be restricted from taking wild animals where the public 
interest is asserted by the state. However, the landowner does have 
the right to prevent others from killing wild animals on his land.43 
As far back as ancient Athens laws were enacted forbidding the 
killing of game, although the justification then was apparently that 
the Athenians enjoyed the chase so much that they were neglecting 
the mechanical arts.44 Roman law described wild animals as having 
no owner, thus belonging to no one, although they could be acquired 
by reducing them to one's possession}5 The only restriction recog-
nized in Roman law, as well as the Institutes of Justinian, was the 
right of the landowner to game on his property.48 Apparently game 
was sufficiently common that the government made no attempt to 
restrict taking. 47 
In feudal Europe the restrictions placed on game-taking became 
more pervasive, and the scholarly debate more ihtense. It was 
argued that God gave dominion over the beasts to man in general, 
and that this natural relationship could not be infringed upon by 
particular men.48 The response was that natural law only permits 
the taking of game by all men, it doesn't command it, and things 
which the natural law only permits can b(i! restricted by the state 
through civil law . 48 Blackstone notes the existence of similar author-
ity in the English kings, although he seems to limit the king's power 
to those wild animals known as "game"; that is, those animals 
worth hunting. 50 
This power of the government to control the use of wild animals 
was vested in the colonial governments, and passed to the state 
governments with the revolution.51 From the earliest days of their 
authority states passed statutes aimed at controlling the taking of 
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game. Even in the frontier society of early America, where game was 
essential to life, the states asserted their authority. 52 
The power of the states to pass laws regulating game was upheld 
in 1896 by the Supreme Court in Geer v. Connecticut. 53 The case 
involved a Connecticut statute which prohibited the killing of game 
for the purpose of transporting it beyond state boundaries. The 
Court reviewed the development of Western law concerning govern-
mental control of wild animals, and concluded that the states had 
undoubted power to control the taking of game. The source of this 
power was the joint ownership of all wild animals by the American 
people as a whole. This common ownership meant that the interest 
of the group in preserving wild animals surpassed an individual's 
right to take game. Moreover, this group interest was assertable by 
the state, acting as the representative of all. This theory of state 
authority, resting in ownership, is known as the "dominum" theory. 
In a later decision, Toomer v. Witsell,54 the Court moved away from 
the "dominum" theory to the "imperium" theory, based on the 
government's power to regulate. Citing Roscoe Pound, the Court 
decided that" ... the whole ownership theory, in fact, is now gen-
erally regarded as a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the 
importance to its people that a state have power to preserve and 
regulate the exploitation of an important resource."55 Thus the po-
lice power theory has replaced the ownership theory as the justifica-
tion for state control of wildlife.58 This change in theoretical basis 
does not seem to have great practical significance.57 
Another interesting aspect of the Geer decision was the Court's 
dictum concerning the state's obligation to exercise its authority 
concerning the taking of game for the benefit of all its citizens: 
Whilst the fundamental principles upon which the common property in 
game rests have undergone no change, the development of free institu- . 
tions has led to the recognition of the fact that the power or control 
lodged in the State, resulting from this common ownership, is to be 
exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit 
of the people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the govern-
ment, as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private individu-
als as distinguished from the public good. 58 
The concept expressed by the Court is that of a Public Trust. In 
administering the trust corpus (wildlife) the state must act to bene-
fit its citizens. This trust might place certain obligations on the 
states, and grant certain rights to citizen beneficiaries. If the state 
is seen as the administrator of the trust, arguably it would have "the 
duty of the trustee to preserve the resource and protect it against 
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loss, dissipation or diminution and to act with diligence, fairness 
and faithfulness in doing so. "59 This latter reasoning goes far beyond 
the Court's holding in Geer, which dealt solely with the state's right 
to control the taking of game, not with its obligations to preserve 
that game. Given the Court's recent reluctance to adopt a Public 
Trust type analysis in other areas,80 it is doubtful that the dictum 
in Geer quoted above has real force today. 
When the absence of any controls over the administration of wild 
animals by the state is added to the limited protection afforded 
domestic animals, it becomes clear that the common law has not 
provided much protection for animals. Domestic animals are 
treated as personal property, subject to the owner's whim. Wild 
animals are treated as common property, available to be exploited 
by all unless the exploitation is regulated by the state. No animal 
has the right to life, or even the right to be free from needless 
suffering, unless the abuse of an animal constitutes a public nuis-
ance or the invasion of another's property right. This total absence 
of legal protection was too much for many people sensitive to animal 
suffering, and resulted in the enactment of statutes aimed at pre-
venting the worst of the abuses. 
B. Early Statutes 
The first anti-cruelty statute in the Western world was enacted 
by the Puritans of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1641. The stat-
ute provided that "no man shall exercise any Tirrany orCrueltie 
towards any bruite Creature which are usuallie kept for man's use" . 
[sicl 8t The next anti-cruelty statute in this country came some 190 
years later, when in 1828 the New York legislature characterized 
malicious killing or torture of an animal as a misdemeanor. 82 Other 
states followed in rapid succession with measures aimed at the worst 
instances of animal abuse.83 These statutes marked the first recogni-
tion in our legal system that animals are something other than 
insensate property, and deserve to be protected, even against their 
owners. As noted above, this radical departure from the common 
law property right was seen as a constitutionally proper attempt to 
protect public morality.84 This is not to say that proponents of these 
statutes were not motivated by concern for the animals. The prob-
lem was that they were dealing with a legal system that did not 
recognize any rights for animals. When only humans have rights, 
then legislation such as the cruelty statues, which interfere with 
human property rights, have to be justified in human terms. A 
particular kind of legal fiction had to be developed for that purpose. 
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The cruelty statutes have not always proved effective in protecting 
animals, and arguably this weakness might be traced back to their 
initial justification. By implication the statutes require a balancing 
of human and animal interests to determine whether a particular 
act constitutes a violation. Not surprisingly, almost any human 
interest is sufficient to outweigh almost any animal interest. A case 
in point is the 1953 decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court in 
State v. Buford. 65 The defendant was charged with violating the 
New Mexico Cruelty to Animals Statute by staging a cockfight. 
That statute provided that if "any person torture, [or] torment 
... any animal" he would be guilty of a misdemeanor.ss Among 
other things, the defendant contended that cockfighting was not 
proscribed by the statute.67 In affirming a dismissal of the informa-
tion, the court was concerned by the broad sweep of the statute, 
feeling that a literal construction might extend to such socially ac-
ceptable activities as baiting hooks with live minnows.s8 The court 
balanced the human and animal interests involved, noted the gener-
ally accepted maxim that penal statutes should be strictly con-
strued, and held that: 
While it is true that in the minds of some men, there is nothing more 
violent, wanton, and cruel, necessarily producing pain and suffering to 
an animal, than placing a cock in a ring with another cock, both 
equipped with artificial spurs, to fight to the death, solely for man's 
amusement and sport, others consider it an honorable sport mellowed 
in the crucible of time so as to become an established tradition not 
unlike calf-roping, steer riding, bull-dogging, and bronco busting . . . 
Admittedly the words 'torture' and 'torment', under the prevailing defi-
nitions which include pain and suffering 'permitted' would seem to em-
brace fighting cocks equipped with artificial spurs or gaffs capable of 
cutting deep wounds and sharp gashes in the cocks, but when looking 
at the statute as a whole we are not convinced the legislature so intended 
it to be construed.'u [emphasis supplied] 
Note that the court appears to be weighing the human interest in 
entertainment against the other human interest of not living in a 
society which inflicts cruelty on animals. It doesn't really discuss 
what the cock's rights might be, if any. Results such as that reached 
in this case are, at bottom, tied into our failure to enact statutes 
granting real rights to animals, as opposed to humans. I will argue 
below that such rights might be insured in a statutory context. 
Apart from the human-centered justification of these statutes, 
they have many structural weaknesses. They fail to deal adequately 
with what should be the first crucial definition: What is an animal 
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within the meaning of this statute? Many of the statutes refer only 
to "any animal". In scientific terms this could refer to anything 
from an amoeba to a chimpanzee. Did the legislators really intend 
that an amoeba and a chimpanzee should have the same rights? Did 
they intend that amoebae be protected at all? Courts have had to 
struggle with this lack of legislative definition. In another cock-
fighting decision, State u. Claiborne,71 the Kansas Supreme Court 
was confronted with a statute which provided that cruelty to ani-
mals was "Subjecting any animal to cruel mistreatment".72 The 
court recognized that all sentient, animate creatures are biologically 
animals,73 but noted that "persons of common intelligence" would 
"consider a chicken a bird, not a hair-bearing animal" ,74 and that 
other Kansas statutes proscribing cruelty to animals were aimed at 
"four-legged animal[s], especially beasts of the field and beasts of 
burden."75 Drawing on this reasoning, they held that game-cocks did 
not come within the statutory phrase "any animal". 78 
On its face such reasoning seems tortuous, but the fault does not 
really lie with the courts as much as with the legislatures. There is 
no anti-cruelty statute in the United States which deals effectively 
with the distinctions between various animals. Some states have 
tried to be selective, limiting a statute's scope to certain types of 
animals. Six statutes apply only to "owned" animals.77 Four stat-
utes apply only to "domestic" animals.78 North Carolina limits its 
act to "useful" animals.78 Rather than drawing meaningful distinc-
tions, these limitations merely eliminate all protection for non-
owned, non-domestic or "non-useful" animals. Such distinctions 
say very little about how one animal suffers as compared to another. 
To be effective and enforceable these statutes must come to grips 
with what animals are, how they suffer, and to what extent different 
species suffer in different ways. District Court judges in misde-
meanor proceedings should not be expected to make meaningful 
distinctions between animals. 
If failure to deal with the word "animal" is the most obvious flaw 
in these statutes, failure to deal with the word "cruelty" is perhaps 
the most debilitating. Most state statutes have language similar to 
that of Mississippi: 
If any person shall override, overdrive, overload, torture, torment, un-
justifiably injure, deprive of necessary sustenance, food or drink, or 
cruelly beat or needlessly mutilate . . . any living creature, every such 
offender shall, for every offense, be guilty of a misdemeanor. so 
This statute specifically lists some of the more common forms of 
cruelty: overriding, overdriving, overloading, and depriving of food 
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or drink. Such specific provisions help courts in deciding whether 
an act is cruel within the meaning of the statute.81 The problem is 
with words like "torture", "torment", "unjustifiably", "cruelly" 
and "needlessly". These words are susceptible of a great many 
meanings. Such general terms may be an advantage or a disadvan-
tage. A judge sympathetic to the plight of animals might bend the 
word "cruelly" much farther than the legislature intended. A differ-
ent judge might consider very little as really cruel, or may feel that 
the legislature did not consider most acts as cruel within the mean-
ing of the statute. A prime example of this type of reasoning is the 
Buford case. 
There are many other weaknesses in these statutes. Few deal 
adequately with the question of intent. Although some require a 
malicious, willful or intentional act, most are unclear on that point. 
This can raise serious problems of interpretation, particularly where 
the cruelty alleged results from omission, such as failure to provide 
food and drink. A California court construed a statute prohibiting 
the infliction of "needless suffering and unnecessary cruelty" as not 
requiring proof of criminal intent or criminal negligence.82 What was 
required was a showing of negligence to the extent that the defen-
dant "intentionally did an act [or failed to act] from which harm 
to the animals was reasonably foreseeable, i.e., foreseeable by a 
reasonably prudent man caring for horses. "83 [The court's empha-
sis]. Because the question of intent can be critical in these cases, 
the failure of the statutes to deal with the question is a serious 
weakness. Additionally, few statutes allow cruelty to be anticipated 
and prevented before it occurs. Massachusetts attempted to resolve 
part of this problem by making it illegal to transport an animal in 
a fashion likely to cause it injury.8. However, enforcement officers 
generally have no recourse until the actual injury is inflicted.8lI The 
penalties provided for in the statutes are normally jail sentences and 
fines for the offenders, with the fines going to the state, not the 
animals, or animal organizations. Such penalties, of course, do the 
animals little good, except perhaps as a deterrent. In sum, the cru-
elty statutes, largely holdovers from the 19th century, are riddled 
with weaknesses. They do not, and cannot in their present form, 
insure the protection of animals adequately. 
Traditionally, the only other attempt by the states to protect 
animals by statute has been to control hunting and fishing. In prac-
tice the states have done little to protect wildlife except grant ad-
ministrative agencies like fish and game commissions the authority 
to develop and protect game species. In addition, other agencies 
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have been given the authority to eliminate animals which allegedly 
pose a health hazard, or are a nuisance to farmers. The result has 
been a wildlife policy which has seriously distorted the natural in-
terdependence of all animals in the wild, sacrificing "undesirable" 
species for the benefit of game species, crops, or domestic animals.86 
The common law, state regulation of hunting and fishing, and the 
cruelty statutes, were essentially the only protection offered animals 
as late as twenty years ago, and still remain the backbone of animal 
protection in most jurisdictions. I have tried to demonstrate that 
these three methods of animal protection all contain serious weak-
nesses, weaknesses severe enough to lead one to the conclusion that 
they in fact provide very little protection. The common law prohib-
its only public nuisances and invasions of property interests. The 
cruelty statutes fail when asserted against even casual human inter-
ests. The hunting statutes protect some animals at the expense of 
others, and even then protect them only so that ultimately they may 
be shot. Only a society which places very little value on animal life 
could accept such an ineffective system of controls. This system of 
controls grew out of a scientific and moral tradition which would not 
accept animals as qualitatively similar to man. However, this tradi-
tion has been seriously undermined by recent scientific research. 
This research, plus a growing concern for the protection and preser-
vation of all life in the face of our ever-expanding industrial society, 
has forced a number of philosophers, psychologists, physical scien-
tists, and others who deal with animals, to seriously question our 
treatment of animals. 
III. MODERN NON-LEGAL CONCEPTS OF ANIMALS IN WESTERN 
THOUGHT 
The direction of modern science, both in physics and in biology, 
appears to be away from concepts of a static world, the world of 
Newton and Linnaeus. This trend is nowhere more evident than in 
the new approaches to studying animals. These new approaches 
have grown out of an 1879 study by Darwin entitled EXPRESSION OF 
THE EMOTIONS IN MAN AND ANIMALS,81 This work expressed an idea 
that was revolutionary in its time: that man's behavior might have 
biological origins and therefore that animals might exhibit correla-
tives of human behavior.88 The converse is of course that humans 
might exhibit correlatives of animal behavior. Out of this early work 
men like Niko Tinbergen and Konrad Lorenz developed a new disci-
pline, ethology, the study ofthe biology ofbehavior.89 It has its roots 
in studies of animal reactions and learning capabilities in laboratory 
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situations, studies undertaken by men such as Ivan Pavlov and B.F. 
Skinner.9o The results of those studies were to demonstrate that 
animals have a behavior, patterns of activity, worth studying. Eth-
ologists, however, have gone beyond the laboratories in making their 
behavioral studies. Lorenz and Tinbergen have studied animals in 
their natural state, observing their interactions both with their envi-
ronment and with their community of fellow animals.91 The rela-
tions between ethologists and behaviorists like Skinner have not 
always been smooth, paralleling the modern scientific struggle be-
tween those who try to learn about man by dissection, and those 
who look to his environment.92 However, for our purposes it is suffi-
cient that both schools have approached animal behavior as some-
thing worthy of study, something which could shed light on human 
behavior. 
Recent studies have gone even further in suggesting that the sup-
posedly vast gulf between the mental capabilities of men and those 
of animals may not be so vast. Most significant of all, they put 
mental ability in the evolutionary model. They suggest that man 
may not be the only animal conscious of himself, able to reason and 
express creative thoughts. No one is saying that dolphins or chimps 
are intellectually as sophisticated as humans, but what is important 
is that some scientists are now saying that these animals have men-
tal capacities similar in kind to humans, if not in degree.93 Our 
whole moral and legal tradition is founded on the assumption that 
there is an unbridgeable gap between men and animals, giving us 
the right to own and exploit them without reference to their best 
interests. If our scientists now tell us that animals are different from 
us only in degree, then our exploitation carries far more serious 
implications than we have been willing to admit. 
One such study of animals is the recent work of Jane Goodall in 
Africa with wild chimpanzees. Her book, IN THE SHADOW OF MAN,94 
presents impressive evidence of chimpanzee behavior patterns quite 
similar to those of humans. When frightened, chimps touch or 
embrace their fellows; subordinate chimps go to great lengths to 
ingratiate themselves with their superiors. When receiving a pleas-
ant surprise they embrace and kiss.95 Perhaps the most important 
evidence of the existence of complex and sophisticated behavior 
patterns that she uncovered was their use of tools. Taking a part of 
the natural world and using it to exploit another part of the natural 
world has been traditionally thought of as a uniquely human trait. 
Goodall observed chimps using long grass stems to fish termites out 
of a termite nest.98 Subsequently she noted many other types of tool-
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using and tool-making behavior, behavior that indicates that wild 
chimpanzees are quite adept at manipulating their surroundings.u7 
If tool-making has been considered one mark of human-like intel-
ligence, another is language. The ability of man to use symbols to 
express ideas and to designate objects has long been considered 
unique. Now even this conceptual barrier raised between man and 
the animals is being torn down. At the Institute for Primate Studies 
in Norman, Oklahoma, Dr. Roger Fouts and his colleagues are con-
tinuing work begun by R. Allen and Beatrice Gardner in Nevada, 
teaching chimpanzees to communicate with humans, and with each 
other, using the hand signals of the American Sign Language.us It 
was thought that this visual approach might be most successful, as 
chimps had proved unable to mimic human sounds because of the 
nature of their vocal apparatus. uu The chimps have demonstrated 
"verbal" ability beyond mere identification. They can form signs 
into requests and questions. loo They express value judgments, refer-
ring to people or other animals with which they are displeased as 
"dirty", or "black bugs" .101 They have even described emotions. One 
chimp, seeing its human foster mother drive off signed "me cry" .102 
They are able to group things by common attributes, for instance 
grouping citrus fruits as "smell fruits" .103 In short, the chimpanzees 
have demonstrated a startling facility for using sign language. 104 The 
implication of this is that the measure most often used to separate 
man from other animals conceptually, the ability to communicate 
via language, is no longer completely valid. Although admittedly at 
a much more primitive level than man, chimps nevertheless can 
"speak" . 
The moral implications of such studies have received very little 
attention in America. Admittedly, a great deal has been written 
recently by ecologists and naturalists about respect for life in the 
sense of saving it from destruction by man. However, the ecologist 
does not address the right of living creatures to life; he just points 
to the wisdom, in terms of man's physical and aesthetic well-being, 
of letting them live. What the new discoveries about animals de-
mand is not more justification for protecting animals because of the 
benefits they provide man. Instead, a recognition is needed that 
animals have a right to live regardless 'of their usefulness. We have 
recognized in our legal system that individual human lives have 
value. We may not vivisect one mongoloid to save ten "normal" 
humans. However, although we may feel emotionally that animals' 
lives have value to them, we have not granted those lives any real 
protection in our anthropocentric legal system. Perhaps such a posi-
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tion might be justified in a world where animals are seen as equiva-
lent to trees and flowers, just another part of the non-human world. 
However, in a world where we must recognize that both men and 
the other creatures are animals, that we are essentially alike, there 
is no logical justification for granting absolute value to human life, 
and absolutely none to animal life. It must be noted that concern 
for animals' lives does not mean allowing cattle to breed and roam 
free, competing with man for food, and eventually starving, as in 
India. We are rapidly developing the ability to control animal births 
without mass slaughter. Giving animals' lives some value in our 
legal system is not the same as giving them the absolute value of 
human lives. Animals are not human, but they are more than rocks, 
and they should be so treated. 
If the first impact on modern thought of our new perspective 
toward animals is that their lives have value, the second must be 
that animals feel pain, both physically and emotionally, and de-
serve to be protected from that pain as a matter of right. There is 
no evidence that pain and fear are any less terrible to at least the 
higher animals than they are to humans. In fact, it has been argued 
that the lack of cognitive activity in animals allows their whole 
consciousness to be filled with sensation, making pain and fear far 
more horrible to them than to US. 105 
Those who seek to protect animals must recognize that occasion-
ally there will be a legitimate conflict between human interests and 
animal interests. The first problem in such a situation will be to 
convince humans that the animals should be considered at all, 
much less be given serious consideration in any balancing of inter-
ests. Assuming that this problem can be overcome by education and 
moral leadership, before any balancing can begin it must first be 
determined that the human interests involved are legitimate, not 
frivolous, and that there is no alternative available which would 
involve a lesser invasion of rights. We must then apply a consistent 
set of moral principles so that the balancing has some rational basis. 
Partrick Corbett, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sus-
sex, has suggested such a moral framework. He posits four principles 
of choice between competing lives: 
That we should give precedence to the relatively complex forms of life 
over the relatively simple, and in particular to those forms of life which 
possess special complexities in sentience and intelligence over those 
which do not; that we should give precedence to those lives with a 
greater over those with a lesser potentiality for growth and develop-
ment-for example the young over the old; that we should give preced-
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ence to those who would otherwise suffer relatively serious as opposed 
to relatively superficial deprivation, so that one creature should not be 
maimed in order to give another a momentary thrill; and that we should 
give precedence to species that are threatened with extinction over those 
that are not. lOS 
It is this kind of seriously considered, consistent approach to the 
morality of our treatment of animals that is suggested by an awak-
ening perception that we are not qualitatively different from them. 
To some extent our legal system has responded to this challenge, 
but has it responded sufficiently? 
IV. MODERN LEGAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS IN AMERICA 
It has been noted above that the common law concerning animals 
is of ancient origin, and has changed very little. This rigidity 
prompted the legislative response embodied in the anti-cruelty stat-
utes. In modem times, the forum for developing new laws concern-
ing animals has shifted significantly to the federal government. Re-
flecting the concern of many that man's contacts with animals have 
become increasingly destructive, Congress has acted to minimize 
some of the worst instances of abuse. One such response resulted 
from the development of the beef cattle industry in the Far West. 
The vast expanse of range land required long distance transporta-
tion of animals for slaughter. When animals were destined for 
slaughter they were likely to be subjected to cruel treatment be-
cause they were going to be killed anyway. Animals were driven into 
cattle cars with sharp spiked prods, twenty cattle into a thirty foot 
car. Calves, sheep and pigs were driven into the same cars under the 
cattle, and all were then transported for days, often in great heat, 
without food, water, or even the possibility of lying down. l07 As a 
result, many animals arrived dead, or with painful injuries. l08 After 
initial legislative responses failed to change the situation,109 Con-
gress enacted the Twenty Eight Hour Law."° This Act required the 
maintenance of way stations where animals could be rested during 
transport. The Twenty Eight Hour Law remains the only federal law 
protecting domestic animals in transit. Although the Department of 
Agriculture inspects the way stations, and proseoutes offenders on 
a regular basis, til the Law is no longer adequate in its present form. 
Because it was passed prior to the advent of motor transportation, 
it contains no provisions for protecting animals transported by 
truck. Efforts to have the law amended to include trucking have 
failed, so today domestic animals carried by trucks are not pro-
tected by federal law."2 This leaves protection of these animals 
LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 221 
dependent on the state anti-cruelty laws, which are difficult to en-
force in these situations because of the rapid movement of the 
trucks through the various states. 
Another more recent example of humane legislation at the federal 
level is the Humane Slaughter Act,1I3 enacted by Congress in 1958. 
This Act declared it to be the public policy of the United States that 
humane methods be used to prevent needless suffering in slaughter-
houses. 1I4 To effect this policy, agencies of the federal government 
were forbidden to purchase meat from slaughterhouses which killed 
animals inhumanely.1I5 This approach has forced the larger packers 
who deal with the federal government to comply with the humane 
standards set forth in the Act. Unfortunately, these large packers 
account for only eighty percent of our meat. 1I8 The smaller packing 
houses that supply the remaining twenty percent are subject only 
to state regulation. Less than one half of the states have Humane 
Slaughter Acts, and a number of those are quite weak.1I7 
Another difficulty with the federal Humane Slaughter Act is its 
treatment of ritual, or kosher, slaughter. The actual method of ko-
sher slaughter is not generally thought to be inhumane. liS The ani-
mal's throat is cut, draining it of blood so that it relatively quickly 
loses consciousness.1l9 The Humane Slaughter Act specifically pro-
vides that such ritual slaughter is humane. 12o The problem is in the 
pre-slaughter handling of the animals. Because of an unfortunate 
conjunction of Department of Agriculture sanitary regulations 
which prohibit contact of the animal's cut neck with the packing 
house floor, and kosher slaughter traditions which require that the 
animal be uninjured, (unstunned), prior to cutting, the animals 
must be hoisted by a shackle attached to one leg, often breaking the 
leg or pelvis, or causing the animal to fall to the floor, all while the 
animal is still conscious. 121 It was because of this extremely painful 
pre-slaughter technique that people interested in animal protection 
recently challenged the Humane Slaughter Act's treatment of ritual 
slaughter. In Jones v. Butz, 122 argued before a three-judge panel in 
the Southern District of New York, the plaintiffs urged that kosher 
slaughter, taking into account the whole procedure, is inhumane, 
and would have been prohibited under the Humane Slaughter Act 
except for legislative accommodation of a religious groUp.123 The 
court declined to question the legislative judgment that kosher 
slaughter is humane. 124 It went further, however, adding that even 
if Congress had found the method to be inhumane, such an accom-
modation to religious interests was not outside the scope of Congres-
sional discretion. 125 The court pointed to other instances of religious 
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accommodation not considered prohibited establishments of reli-
gion under the First Amendment, such as Sunday closing laws or 
draft exemptions for conscientious objectors.128 The court felt that 
an accomm.odation for religious dietary restrictions, such as was 
involved here, was comparable to these earlier valid accommoda-
tions. l27 On appeal the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
District Court decision in a per curiam opinion,l28 thus ending the 
attack on the kosher slaughter exemption through the courts. The 
fight against present techniques of kosher slaughter is hardly over, 
however. Animal protection groups are lobbying to have the exemp-
tion removed, and working with livestock experts seeking to develop 
a less painful method of pre-slaughter treatment. 
The only other major federal effort in the area of domestic animal 
protection is the Animal Welfare Act of 1970,128 This Act is aimed 
at conditions under which animals are kept in pet shops, zoos and 
laboratories. It, and its predecessor, the Laboratory Animal Welfare 
Act of 1966,130 grew out of increasing public alarm over the theft of 
privately owned animals for resale to scientific institutions, and the 
conditions under which animals were kept by animal dealers and in 
laboratories. 131 The Animal Welfare Act provides protection for most 
warm blooded animals132 by requiring that research facilities, exhib-
itors and wholesale pet dealers be licensed by the Secretary of Agri-
culture,133 and meet certain standards regarding the. conditions 
under which the animals are kept. 134 It established by law: 
the humane ethic that animals should be accorded the basic creature 
comforts of adequate housing, ample food and water, reasonable han-
dling, decent sanitation, sufficient ventilation, shelter from extremes of 
weather and temperatures, and adequate veterinary care including the 
appropriate use of pain-killing drugs. l35 
What the Act gave with one hand, however, it took away partially 
with the other: 
At the same time this ethic is embraced, the bill recognizes the responsi-
bility and specifically preserves the necessary domain of the medical 
community. The bill in no manner authorizes the disruption or interfer-
ence with scientific research or experimentation. pnder this bill the 
research scientist still holds the key to the laboratory door,136 
The above language, from the House Report on the bill which 
became the Animal Welfare Act,137 indicates a strong Congressional 
policy that what a scientist does inside his laboratory shouJd be 
beyond public scrutiny. The problem with such a policy is that it 
prevents a moral evaluation of experimental techniques by any par-
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ties but the scientists themselves. 
Some of the original versions of the Animal Welfare Act would 
have given the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare some 
authority over experimental design. 13s The strong lobbying effort of 
research interests resulted in the present compromise: control before 
and after experimentation, but not over the experiment itself.13B 
This strong opposition apparently stems from a feeling on the part 
of researchers that any control over experimental design is equiva-
lent to or will result in absolute prohibition of experiments on live 
animals. As the president of the National Society for Medical Re-
search put it after the 1970 Act was passed: 
In the future only antivivisectionists will attempt to introduce addi-
tional legislation. This is not to say that such legislation will not be 
introduced. There are many antivivisectionists in American society. 
However, now that housing and care, including veterinary care, of all 
warm blooded animals throughout their stay in scientific laboratories 
are subject to federal inspection and regulations, any attempt to legis-
late control of scientific design and execution of experiments would have 
to be made as straightforward antivivisection legislation. 140 [emphasis 
supplied]. 
By definition, an antivivisectionist is opposed to all experimenta-
tion on living animals. Surely there is a middle ground between a 
position which advocates no control over animal experimentation, 
and one which advocates a complete prohibition of such experimen-
tation. At the very least this middle ground would demand that 
higher forms of animal life be treated with more consideration than 
lower forms, that painful experiments be replaced, where possible, 
with less painful alternatives, and that experiments be allowed only 
when aimed at providing some new and useful information. It was 
this type of compromise that was not struck by the Animal Welfare 
Act, and that I have tried to provide in the Model Act set forth infra. 
The Animal Welfare Act, the Humane Slaughter Act, and the 
Twenty Eight Hour Law, are the only major pieces offederallegisla-
tion aimed exclusively at ensuring humane treatment for animals. 141 
Each of these three statutes is limited in scope, and thus provides 
only a partial solution to the problem each was intended to address. 
The Animal Welfare Act leaves animals at the laboratory door. The 
Humane Slaughter Act does not reach slaughterhouses which do not 
contract with the federal government, and allows arguably inhu-
mane kosher slaughter techniques. The Twenty Eight Hour Law 
does not reach domestic animals transported by truck. Each of these 
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statutes needs reconsideration and revision if they are to fulfill the 
humane ideals that let to their passage. 
Although federal attempts to provide humane treatment have 
been less than a success, efforts in the area of species protection 
have been somewhat better. Over the last ten years Congress has 
become increasingly aware that whole species of animals are declin-
ing and disappearing as a result of man's incursions and pollution. 
This growing awareness has been a part of a more general movement 
to preserve and protect all of the natural world. Since animals, as 
well as men, depend on a ref;lsonably clean environment, the wave 
of recent federal legislation aimed at environmental protection 
should benefit them.1(2 In addition, there is an increasing amount 
of legislation on the federal level which seeks to deal directly with 
the problems of wildlife. 1(3 Congress had traditionally been reluctant 
to address wildlife questions, at least in part because it was felt that 
such decisions were reserved to the states. In Geer v. Connecticut1(( 
the Supreme Court left the impression that it was the States' re-
sponsibility to control the taking of wildlife, not the federal govern-
ment's.I(5 Since that decision writers have attacked the idea of ex-
clusive state control, indicating at least two bases for federal action: 
the territorial power and the power to regulate interstate com-
merce.1(6 The development of these arguments is beyond the scope 
of this article, but they have been accepted, at least by Congress. 
The federal government has become increasingly involved in wild-
life protection, and its new role has not been seriously questioned. 
It seems likely that this role will continue to increase, hopefully with 
more attempts to coordinate wildlife policy between the state and 
federal governments. The federal government, then, has been active 
in recent years in attempting to protect animals, both from inhu-
mane treatment and from species depletion. This new legislative 
concern has also been expressed on the state level, although to a 
lesser extent. 
As noted above, the focus of state animal protection is still the 
anti-cruelty statute. In many states these statutes have undergone 
considerable expansion. In New York, for instance, there are now 
nineteen separate sections of the Animal Laws which detail specific 
types of prohibited acts.1(7 Examples are: instigating fights between 
animals, us failing to provide proper food and drink,I(8 carrying an 
animal in a cruel manner,150 dog stealing,151 and selling or offering 
to sell a diseased animal. 152 Such specific standards have the advan-
tage of being easy to understand and easier to enforce than more 
general provisions. The reason for their enactment was apparently 
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to make it clear that certain activities are prohibited. There has 
been little method in their enactment however, as they were passed 
as "boiler plate" and not as part of a comprehensive animal protec-
tion plan. This lack of good statutory form has disturbed some 
recent law revisors. In states such as New Yorkl53 and Massachu-
setts,154 recent proposed revisions of the criminal laws have sug-
gested a return to a more general anti-cruelty law. Such proposals, 
concerned with statutory form, fail to take into account the prob-
lems of enforcement that purely general anti-cruelty provisions 
present. Consider the proposed revision to the anti-cruelty statute 
in Massachusetts: 
§ 11 Cruelty to Animals: 
(a) A person is guilty of cruelty to animals, a class B misdemeanor, if 
he wilfully: 
(1) Subjects any animal to cruel mistreatment; 
(2) Subjects any animal in his custody to cruel neglect; or 
(3) Kills or injures any animal belonging to another person without 
legal privilege or the consent of the owner. 
(b) As used in this section 'cruel mistreatment' includes cutting the 
bone, muscles or tendons of the tail of a horse for the purpose of docking 
or setting up the tail, or cropping or cutting off the ear of a dog, in whole 
or in part, unless done by a veterinarian registered under chapter one 
hundred and twelve. 
(c) Paragraph (a}(1) and (a)(2) shall not apply to accepted veterinary 
practices or to activities carried on for purposes of scientific research. 155 
There are a number of objectionable factors in this statute, such 
as exemption of all cruelty practiced in the context of scientific 
research, and making cruelty to the animal depend on consent of the 
owner. The greatest weakness however is the return to a broad gen-
eral phrase, "cruel mistreatment", to reach all instances of cruelty. 
There is no attempt to define the term "cruel" or the term "ani-
mal". Such broad undefined terms are difficult to understand and 
even more difficult to enforce. As a whole, the proposed revision is 
considerably weaker than the existing statute. 158 
This is not to say that the current trend at the state level is away 
from animal protection. Proposed revisions such as the one for Mas-
sachusetts have been successfully opposed by animal interest 
groups.157 In addition, there are good examples of state protection 
statutes designed to fill gaps in the anti-cruelty laws. One such 
example is a recent Massachusetts statute aimed at eliminating 
impulse buying of exotic pets. 158 Animals which need special care, 
or which should not be kept as pets at all, are too often bought as 
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novelties and then neglected and left to die. This statute prohibits 
a pet shop from stocking such animals unless it has a licensed buyer 
waiting for a particular animal. It is this sort of anticipation of 
cruelty thatis difficult to build into a traditional anti-cruelty crimi-
nal statute, and is therefore well-suited for specific legislative treat-
ment. 
The states are also beginning to move into the environmental 
protection area. A number of states have enacted general environ-
mental protection statutes. 15S These statutes have two important 
aspects: they grant private citizens or public interest groups access 
to the courts, and they proclaim a state policy aimed at protecting 
and preserving the natural world. 160 However, this general concern 
for the environment has not been followed by specific wildlife pro-
tection statutes as on the federal level. Hopefully, this new mandate 
provided by the environmental protection statutes will spur both 
the enactment of statutes aimed at protecting and developing all 
wildlife, and the movement of state fish and game commissions 
away from their traditional preoccupation with hunting and fishing 
stock to a more integrated approach. 161 
Progress on the state level, then, is less evident than on the federal 
level. The anti-cruelty statutes remain the basic animal protection 
laws. While these statutes have added some specific provisions, 
their basic format has not changed. They are not designed to antici-
pate and thereby prevent cruelty. They come into play only after 
the animal suffers, and then act only to punish the human offender. 
Many of these statutes do not provide techniques for removing the 
afflicted animal from its tormentor with any rapidity. Fines re-
covered from offenders normally go into the General Fund. As a 
result, they do not serve to make the animal whole, or even to fund 
animal protection activities of the state. The statutes still fail to 
define the crucial terms "animal" and "cruelty". In short, the anti-
cruelty statutes are still inadequate. This inadequacy is crucial be-
cause these statutes are the real heart of animal protection in this 
country. As we have seen, federal efforts at insuring humane treat-
ment are limited in scope, and even within those limitations have 
weaknesses. Although there are many things that could be done on 
the federal level, such as setting standards for research under gov-
ernment grant or contract or strengthening the humane transporta-
tion laws, the real focus of animal protection is likely to remain at 
the state level. Even in those areas in which the federal government 
purports to act, an effective state backup is essential to fill loopholes 
in the federal plan, and to provide a supplement to federal enforce-
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ment capabilities. 
I have argued that our changing ideas about animals mandate a 
change in the treatment that o'ur legal system accords them. Al-
though some progress has been made, it seems clear that the modern 
legislative response, particularly at the state level, has been inade-
quate. Because effective animal protection at the state level is the 
key to better treament of animals, the most pressing concern of 
animal interest groups is to develop a locally-oriented, enforceable, 
animal protection plan. 
V. TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 
A. The Nature of a Legal Right 
In a society such as ours, where formal interhuman and human-
governmental relationships are controlled by laws, the amount of 
protection one receives is a function of the legal rights one holds. 
Fundamentally, a legal right involves the assurance by society that 
when another person acts inconsistently with a right that you hold, 
an authoritative public body will give some amount of consideration 
to your protest. 162 However, more than this authoritative review 
must be present before one can really be said to be protected by a 
legal right. Christopher Stone, Professor of Law at the University of 
Southern California, has argued that before one can be said to be a 
holder of legal rights, three other criteria must be satisfied: 
. . . first, that the thing can institute legal actions at its behest; second, 
that in determing the granting of legal relief, the court must take injury 
to it into account; and, third, that relief must run to the benefit of it. 163 
[his emphasis]. 
Stone then gives us an example of just what these criteria imply: 
To illustrate, even as between two societies that condone slavery there 
is a fundamental difference between 8 1, in which a master can (if he 
chooses), go to court and collect reduced chattel value damages from 
someone who has beaten his slave, and 8 2, in which the slave can insti-
tute proceedings himself, for his own recovery, damages being measured 
by, say, his pain and suffering. Notice that neither society is so struc-
tured as to leave wholly unprotected the slave's interests in not being 
beaten. But in 8 2 as opposed to 8 1, there are three operationally signifi-
cant advantages that the slave has, and these make the slave in 8 2, 
albeit a slave, a holder of rights164 [his emphasis]. 
The three operationally significant advantages are that slave 8 2 can 
institute proceedings in his own behalf, and not have to depend on 
his master to defend him; that once in court, the court will look to 
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his injuries, what he rather than his master has suffered; and that 
whatever relief is given will run to his benefit, not his owner's. 
Real protection in our legal system, then, involves more than 
protection as mere property. It involves the right to be heard, the 
right to be treated as having a unique worth. Such protection has 
not been limited exclusively to humans. Corporations, ships and 
governmental entities all are granted legal identity.165 Obviously 
these non-human parties could not appear in court to seek remedy 
for injuries unless human spokesmen were allowed to argue in their 
behalf. Yet we have been willing to confer on them the status of 
rights-holders because we have made the judgment that they are 
sufficiently unique and valuable to deserve protection in and of 
themselves. Similarly, humans who are incompetent to assert their 
own rights are still granted full protection. Children and the men-
tally ill or retarded may argue for their own interests before our 
courts through guardians. 168 
Should animals have the right to be represented in court? To 
receive damages for injuries inflicted? I have tried to argue that 
animals, as sentient living creatures, are more than inanimate ob-
jects, that they are occasionally startlingly close to humans in men-
tal capacity, and in the way they suffer. I have also detailed our 
present legal concepts of animals. The common law regards animals 
as property, with no rights of their own. Our statutory scheme, 
although it has grown considerably in recent years, is still based on 
two assumptions: that cruelty to animals should be prevented, if at 
all, because it corrupts human morality, and that species should be 
saved from extinction because animals are an important natural 
resource. Neither of these assumptions gives much consideration to 
the unique value of individual animal lives. As a result we punish 
mistreatment of animals, but we neither anticipate mistreatment 
nor remedy it by making the animal whole, as opposed to the owner. 
This is not to argue that animals should be treated as humans in 
our courts. Humans have an almost absolute protection against 
death and injury, because we recognize individual human lives as 
having great worth. The present argument is that animals' lives 
have value to them, and in that sense they are closer to us than they 
are to rocks. We should recognize this value, and give animals at 
least a qualified right to protect themselves. Within a limited area 
they should have access to courts through legal guardians to assert 
their interests. The courts, when weighing those interests, should 
look to the injury suffered by the animal, and to a remedy which 
would best protect the animal or make it whole. 
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What is needed to make animals holders of legal rights, and there-
fore truly protected, is a legal system which gives those who would 
protect them access to the full range of judicial remedies available 
to humans when threatened with death or injury. The question, of 
course, is how to obtain this access. 
B. Equitable Enforcement of Criminal Statutes 
Proceeding on the assumption that it is generally easier to work 
within an existing system of laws than to create a new one, it first 
must be asked if the present animal protection statutes can be used 
more productively. Generally speaking, these statutes are criminal 
statutes, enforceable by law enforcement officers, and providing 
criminal penalties for offenders. Such statutes neither provide for 
suits on behalf of animals, nor provide remedies that run to their 
benefit. Yet these statutes do provide a legislative statement of the 
duty of care owed to animals. In some similar situations courts of 
equity have been willing to listen to plaintiffs, both public and 
private, who have argued that a statement of a duty in a criminal 
statute should provide the basis for injunctive relief. 187 The argu-
ment of these plaintiffs has rested on the rationale that the remedy 
at law is inadequate. 188 This requires a rather large step by the court, 
in that it must find that the legislature did not intend the remedy 
provided in the criminal statute to be exclusive. 18B An example of 
how a court handles this kind of problem was provided by the New 
York Court of Appeals in People ex reI. Bennett u. Laman. 170 In that 
case the attorney general sought an injunction against violations of 
a state criminal statute which prohibited practicing medicine with-
out a license. The attorney general alleged that his remedy at law 
was inadequate because juries refused, apparently because of sym-
pathy, to convict the defendant. The court treated the case as essen-
tially a public nuisance action: 
That a court of equity will not undertake the enforcement of the 
criminal law, and will not enjoin the commission of a crime is a principle 
of equity jurisprudence that is settled beyond any question. There can 
equally be no doubt that the criminal nature of an act will not deprive 
equity of the jurisdiction that would otherwise attach. . . Whether or 
not the act sought to be enjoined is a crime, is immaterial. Equity does 
not seek to enjoin it simply because it is a crime; it seeks to protect some 
proper interest. . . Equity does not pretend to punish the perpetrator 
for the a..ct; it attempts to protect the right of the party (here the People) 
seeking relief, and to prevent the performance of the act or acts, which 
here may injure many. 171 
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The court found that the defendant's practice of medicine with-
out a license was a threat to public health, and enjoined further 
violations. 172 However, it appears unlikely that this type of action 
holds much promise for protecting animals. Equitable enforcement 
of criminal statutes has hardly won widespread acceptance. 173 An-
other problem is that because these actions are characterized as 
public nuisance-type suits, it is difficult for anyone except the repre-
sentative of the people, the attorney general, to obtain standing. 174 
In most cases of brutality to animals, it is only the animals them-
selves that suffer special damages. Thus access to the courts would 
not be significantly different than it is now; i. e., limited to the state. 
However, if equitable actions on behalf of animals were allowed, 
a more substantial change in the law would occur in the area of 
remedies. Prevention, or forbidding continuation, of violations 
would be far preferable with respect to the animal than merely 
invoking criminal sanctions against the offender. It is this type of 
equitable relief that is essential to achieve adequate protection for 
animals. Yet in weighing whether to grant relief, the court would 
still have to look to the vague standards set forth in the present anti-
cruelty statutes. On balance, then, it seems unlikely that attempts 
to enforce present anti-cruelty statutes through equitable actions 
would substantially improve the position of animals. 
C. Creation of a New Tort at Common Law 
A second approach to achieving real legal protection for animals 
might be to attempt to convince a court to change the common law 
in its jurisdiction by creating a new tort. This is not without preced-
ent. At the end of the last century Samuel Warren and Louis Bran-
deis, in a famous law review article,175 were responsible for the gen-
eral acceptance of a new tort, the invasion of privacy. Although the 
explosion of legislative activity has removed the common law from 
center stage, it still plays an important role in determining the 
rights of litigants in private actions. It has often been, and should 
remain, a creative and dynamic adjunct to the legislative process. 
Assuming that a court could be convinced to listen to such argu-
ments, it could be argued that the common law should recognize 
animals as holders of legal rights, both because animals deserve to 
be protected, and because animals are not protected adequately by 
present criminal statutes. If a court would go this far, then it would 
be necessary to frame the boundaries of the new right. The guardian 
of the animal would have to establish that the defendant caused the 
animal significant observable pain or suffering not expressly ex-
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empted by statute (as in the case of hunting, slaughtering, etc.). 
Defenses might be that the pain inflicted was necessary to prevent 
injury or death to other animals or humans, or to ease the animal's 
suffering. All the normally available civil and equitable remedies 
would be available to protect the animal, or make it whole. 
Of course the problem with all of this is that it is extremely 
doubtful that any court would venture this far off the beaten path. 
Even in recognizing the tort of invasion of privacy the courts were 
merely granting a new right to previous rights-holders, that is, 
human beings. To develop a tort of infliction of pain on an animal, 
courts would have to bestow rights on a previously right-less class, 
a job normally reserved to the legislature. Courts would have to 
struggle with difficult questions of fact, such as what types of ani-
mals feel pain in what ways. They would also be faced with policy 
questions, involving a balancing of human and animal interests, 
without legislative guidance. Courts, when faced with the prospect 
of such broad problems, are loathe to enter new ground. This cau-
tion is exemplified by the history of the tort of infliction of wrongful 
death. Early English decisions held that a tort dies with the victim, 
thus giving the victim's heirs no cause of action against the tortfea-
sor.176 The feeling was that a tort is a personal wrong, non-
transferrable at death. 177 Although this worked great hardship on 
survivors, the courts remained unbending in their unwillingness to 
venture into what they felt was a completely foreign area for tort 
law. Ultimately the legislatures were forced to fill the void by specif-
ically granting a right of action in tort to a class (survivors), which 
had no right of action in tort previously. 178 
As with equitable enforcement of existing criminal statutes, it 
appears unlikely that attempts to win acceptance of a new tort 
would measurably aid the position of animals. Although, if ac-
cepted, the tort remedy would provide access to the full range of 
judicial remedies needed, it is too much to expect that a court would 
adopt such a scheme on its own motion. 
D. Revising Present Statutes-A Model Statute 
It appears that if animals are going to win the right to be repre-
sented in court, the right to have their, as opposed to the state's or 
their owner's injuries considered, and the right to have the court's 
remedy flow to their benefit, the impetus will have to come from the 
legislature. Nothing less than a complete reconsideration and revi-
sion of existing animal protection statutes is required. Others have 
suggested changes to existing statutes, or proposed completely new 
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legislative schemesl79-for example, the set of Model State Animal 
Protection Statutes proposed by the Committee for Humane Legis-
lation. 180 The focal point of the Committee's Model Statutes is the 
creation of a Department of Animal Protection, charged with ad-
ministering all of the state's animal programs.181 This Department 
would be completely funded by fees generated from licenses re-
quired of all animal activities, defined as all activities, profit or non-
profit, which involve keeping, selling or exhibiting animals. 182 Such 
a broad licensing program would be a vital part of any animal pro-
tection program. It would insure that all facilities must meet mini-
mum standards before being allowed to operate, and it would pro-
vide the state with information concerning the number and type of 
animal activities in the state. Through revocation of license proce-
dures it would also provide a convenient method of dealing with 
offenders. The Committee for Humane Legislation's Model Act 
would provide an excellent administrative framework for dealing 
with animal protection problems. Sections of the Model Statute 
proposed infra which would fit in well with the Committee's ap-
proach are specifically marked. The Committee, however, did not 
undertake a thorough re-analysis of anti-cruelty statutes, and with-
out such a reformulation of the standard of care owed animals, the 
creation of a new administrative framework would likely be merely 
cosmetic. I have attempted to show that the present legislative for-
mulation of the standard of care is confusing, often unenforceable, 
and generally inadequate. Before animals will be effectively pro-
tected, the anti-cruelty statutes must be revised or replaced. In an 
effort to stimulate this revision, and to set forth some of the changes 
that I feel are necessary, the following Model Act is proposed. 
AN ACT ESTABLISHING STANDARDS OF CARE OWED 
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101 Statement of Public Policy: 
The legislature finds that certain animals can and do experi-
ence pain and suffering as a result of their contact with human 
beings. On occasion this suffering may result from an intention-
ally inhumane act. On other occasions it may result from simple 
failure on the part of the animal's custodian to exercise a 
reasonable degree of care in his contact with the animal. While 
in rare situations this suffering may be justified by important 
human needs, most often it is the result of unnecessary human 
activities. The legislature finds that the infliction of unjustifiable 
pain on animals is a corrupting influence on public morality, and 
an outrage against living, sentient creatures which deserve to be 
treated with respect. 
Therefore, it is the policy of this State that certain animals be 
protected from the infliction of pain and suffering caused, either 
intentionally or by neglect, except in certain specifically ex-
empted instances. The provisions of this Act are to be liberally 
construed to insure the realization of the policy expressed in this 
section. 
COMMENT: This section is intended to declare a strong public 
policy that certain animals should be protected against all but spe-
cifically exempted cruelty. It sets forth a~ a basis for the Act not 
merely the corrupting influence of cruelty, but the wrong that cru-
elty constitutes to the animal itself. Most importantly, it gives to 
the judiciary a mandate that the Act should be liberally construed, 
hopefully foreclosing judicial whittling away at the Act, such as 
occurred in the Buford case. 
102 Definitions: 
As used in this Act: 
(a) "Class A animal" means any chimpanzee, gorilla, or 
dolphin: wild, in captivity, or domesticated. 
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(b) "Clasl; B animal" means any mammal: wild, in captivity, 
or domesticated, except those mammals included within Class A. 
(c) "Class C animal" means any vertebrate: wild, in captivitiy, 
or domesticated, except those vertebrates included within Class 
A or Class B. 
(d) "Significant observable pain or suffering" means any un-
pleasant or distressing sensation sufficient to cause more than 
brief discomfort, observable to a person exercising a reasonable 
degree of care. 
(e) "Animal control facility" means any activity licensed by the 
State or a political subdivision thereof to receive and dispose of 
stray, unwanted or abandoned animals. 
(f) "Causing" means acting or omitting to act where such act 
or omission is a substantial factor in bringing about the violation. 
It includes, but is not limited to, arranging, promoting, organiz-
ing, managing, advertising, producing, conducting or participat-
ing in any contest, exhibition, or other private or public use of 
animals, wherein it is reasonable to expect that a violation will 
occur. 
(g) "Animal under one's control" means: 
(1) An animal which one owns, or 
(2) A wild or stray animal which one has restrained from 
leaving one's presence in any way, for any period of time. 
COMMENT: This section is of vital importance to the overall 
effectiveness of the Act, because it provides specific standards to be 
used in interpreting the statutory language. The first three subsec-
tions set out the specific types of animals protected. The definition 
of animal classes is tied to the relative advancement of the animal 
on the evolutionary scale, and reflects a presumption that the closer 
the animal is to man, the more deserving it is of protection. Subsec-
tion (d) is an attempt to set forth an understandable standard as 
to what degree of pain or suffering triggers a violation. Subsection 
(f) sets forth a common standard of proximate causation,l83 as well 
as extending that standard specifically to promotors and others in-
directly responsible for the animals' plight, if not the direct cause 
of it. 1s4 Finally, subsection (g) defines when an animal is under one's 
control. 
103 Persons Who May Enforce This Act: 
(a) Criminal Provisions: The criminal provisions of this Act 
may be enforced by any duly appointed law enforcement officer 
of this State or a political subdivision thereof, including any spe-
cial officers appointed for the sole purpose of enforcing this Act. 
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(b) Civil Provisions: The attorney general, any political subdi-
vision of the State, any instrumentality or agency of the State, 
any natural person, partnership, corporation, association, organi-
zation, charitable or educational institution or other legal entity 
may maintain an action in the [Superior Court] for the county 
wherein the alleged violation occurred, or wherein the defendant 
is located, resides or conducts business, on behalf of any animal 
protected by this Act. Such action will be in the name of the 
animal, and may seek declaratory or injunctive relief, as well as 
civil damages or forfeitures, against the State, any political sub-
division of the state, any instrumentality or agency of the State, 
any natural person, partnership, corporation, association, organi-
zation, charitable or educational institution or other legal entity, 
acting alone or in combination with others, for any violation of 
the provisions of this Act. Sovereign immunity shall not be as-
serted as a defense to any civil action brought pursuant to the 
provisions of this Act. Liability in the case of joint tortfeasors 
shall be joint and several. 
COMMENT: This section provides one of the most important 
changes from the traditional anti-cruelty laws. It retains the tradi-
tional enforcement power over criminal statutes in the state, includ-
ing special enforcement officers such as might be created under a 
Department of Animal Protection, or are now authorized to enforce 
the anti-cruelty statutes, such as SPCA officers. However, in addi-
tion the statute extends to the state, legal entities, and natural 
persons the right to institute civil actions on behalf of afflicted 
animals. It should be emphasized that the civil action would be on 
behalf of the animal, not the party bringing the suit. The animal's 
injury must be considered, and available remedies should run first 
to the animal. The effect of this section is to extend the full range 
of legal and equitable protection to animals, and similarly to extend 
the full range of criminal, legal and equitable sanctions against 
violators. 
104 Cruelty to Class A Animals: 
Cruelty to Class A Animals is: 
(a) Causing a Class A Animal significant observable pain or 
suffering, unless such pain or suffering is specifically exempted 
under this section or other provisions of this Act. 
(b) Causing the death of a Class A Animal by any means, unless 
such infliction of death: 
(1) Is necessary to protect the health or safety of humans 
or other animals, or 
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(2) Is necessary to relieve the animal of pain or suffering 
caused by injury or disease, if such pain or suffering cannot 
be relieved by medical attention in the opinion of a duly 
licensed veterinarian, or 
(3) Is performed.at an animal control facility after the ani-
mal has remained unclainied or abandoned, and reasonable 
attempts to obtain adoption have proved unsuccessful for a 
period of not less than 14 days from the day on which the 
animal is received by such facility. 
When death may be inflicted under one of the above provi-
sions, the manner of causing death must not involve signifi-
cantly more pain or suffering to the animal than would result 
from any other method of inflicting death which is a reasona-
ble alternative economically, and in terms of health and 
safety. 
(c) Abandoning a Class A Animal in any environment which is 
not natural to it, or in which it is no longer capable of surviving, 
after it has been under one's control. 
(d) Failure to provide care for a Class A Animal under one's 
control, including, but not limited to, failure to provide: 
(1) Sanitary conditions 
(2) Nutrition 
(3) Shelter 
(4) Medical care 
(5) Opportunity for exercise 
(6) Periods of rest sufficient to maintain the animal in good 
health, and to prevent the occurrence of significant observ-
able pain or suffering in the animal. 
(e) Performing a scientific experiment on a Class A Animal 
which involves the infliction of significant observable pain or suf-
fering, unless such experiment: 
[1. - Optional] [Is conducted in a research facility licensed 
by the State, and] 
[lor 2] Involves less pain or suffering than would result 
from any other experimental design which would provide 
equivalent information, and would be economically feasible, 
and 
[2 or 3] Is limited solely to attempts to gain information 
about the cause, prevention, treatment or cure of human or 
animal disease, injury or mental disorder. 
COMMENT: This section attempts to blend general and specific 
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provisions prohibiting infliction of pain by action or omission. The 
section reflects a high concern for the lives of Class A animals by 
forbidding the infliction of death even by humane means except in 
certain limited circumstances (§ I04(b)(I-3». Scientific experimen-
tation is limited to the most humane feasible design, and to the 
search for information about human or animal health only 
(§ I04(e)(2-3». Attempts to learn about the animals' beh~vior pat-
terns by infliction of pain are not allowed unless such research is 
justified by health-related reasons. Similarly, experiments asso-
ciated with weapons research would generally not be allowed, unless 
directly related to counteracting the health effects of such weapons. 
An optional section (§ I04(e)(I» would tie in to a State Animal 
Activities licensing plan such as proposed by the Committee for 
Humane Legislation. In addition, the section sets forth affirmative 
duties owed an animal after it has been brought under one's control 
(§ I04(c)-(d».185 
105 Cruelty to Class B Animals: 
Cruelty to Class B Animals is: 
(a) Causing a Class B Animal significant observable pain or 
suffering, unless such pain or suffering is specifically exempted 
under this section or other provisions of this Act. 
(b) Causing the death of a Class B Animal in an inhumane 
manner. For the purposes of this subsection causing death in an 
inhumane manner means using any method which involves sig-
nificantly more pain or suffering than would result from any other 
method which is a reasonable alternative, economically, and in 
terms of health and safety. This subsection applies to both pri-
vate and commercial slaughter, as well as all other instances of 
death infliction unless specifically exempted. 
(c) Abandoning a Class B Animal in any environment which is 
not natural to it, or in which it is no longer capable of surviving, 
after it has been under one's control. 
(d) Failing to provide care for a Class B Animal under one's 
control, including, but not limited to, failure to provide: 
(I) Sanitary conditions 
(2) Nutrition 
(3) Shelter 
(4) Medical care 
(5) Opportunity for exercise 
(6) Periods of rest sufficient to maintain the animal in good 
health, and to prevent the occurrence of significant observ-
able pain or suffering in the animal. 
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(e) Performing a scientific experiment on a Class B Animal 
which involves the infliction of significant observable pain or suf-
fering, unless such experiment: 
[1. - Optional] [Is conducted in a research facility licensed 
by the State, and] 
[lor 2] Involves less pain or suffering than would result 
from any other experimental design which would provide 
equivalent information, and would be economically feasible, 
and 
[2 or 3] Is limited solely to attempts to gain information 
about the cause, prevention, treatment or cure of human or 
animal disease, injury, mental disorder, or behavior. 
COMMENT: This section repeats the protections afforded by 
subsections 104(a), (c) and (d). It recognizes, however, a general 
right to end a Class B animal's life, as long as death is caused by 
the most painless method feasible (§ 105(g». Subsection 105(b) also 
specifically extends to commercial slaughtering activities. This 
subsection, coupled with Section 114 infra, dealing with Regula-
tions, would provide the foundation for establishing humane slaugh-
tering practices in all commercial slaughterhouses. This subsection 
would not allow kosher slaughter to the extent that inhumane pre-
slaughter handling is practiced. Subsection 105(e) is essentially the 
same as subsection 104(e), except that research solely for the study 
of behavior is allowed. 
106 Cruelty to Class C Animals: 
Cruelty to Class C Animals is: 
(a) Causing a Class C Animal significant observable pain or 
suffering, unless such pain or suffering is specifically exempted 
under this section or other provisions of this Act. 
(b) Causing the death of a Class C Animal in an inhumane 
manner. For the purposes of this subsection causing death in an 
inhumane manner means prolonging the consciousness of the ani-
mal longer than is required during the killing process. 
(c) Abandoning a Class C Animal in any environment which is 
not natural to it, or in which it is no longer capable of surviving, 
after it has been under one's control. 
(d) Failing to provide care for a Class C Animal under one's 
control, including, but not limited to, failure to provide: 
(1) Sanitary conditions 
(2) Nutrition 
(3) Shelter 
(4) Medical care 
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(5) Opportunity for exercise 
(6) Periods of rest sufficient to maintain the animal in good 
health, and to prevent the occurrence of significant observ-
able pain or suffering in the animal. 
(e) Performing a scientific experiment on a Class C Animal 
which involves the infliction of significant observable pain or suf-
fering, unless such experiment: 
[1. - Optional][Is conducted in a research facility licensed 
by the State, and] 
[1 or 2] Involves less pain or suffering than would result 
from any other experimental design which would provide 
equivalent information, and would be economically feasible. 
COMMENT: This section repeats the protection afforded by 
subsections 104-105(a), (c) and (d). As in subsection 105(b), the 
right to inflict death is retained. However, under subsection 106(b) 
there is no requirement that the most humane method be selected, 
just that the animal's consciousness not be unnecessarily prolonged. 
Subsection 106(e) does not require that the experiment be for a 
specific approved purpose, but it does retain the requirement that 
the most humane technique be used. 
107 Exemptions: 
The infliction of pain or death on animals as the result of hunt-
ing, fishing, or treatment by a duly licensed veterinarian, is not 
proscribed by the provisions of this Act. The infliction of pain or 
death on animals as a result of any other human act, activity or 
omission is specifically included within the provisions of this Act. 
COMMENT: This section recognizes the political impossibility of 
attempting to include hunting and fishing practices within a general 
anti-cruelty statute. However, this does not mean that state legisla-
tures should ignore the more inhumane of these practices. It reflects 
merely that they are more easily dealt with in the context of fish and 
game statutes. The section also makes it clear that activities not 
specifically excluded should be considered included. One such ac-
tivity not excluded which may create controversy is trapping. Trap-
ping would be allowed under this statute only to the extent that it 
conforms to the standards set forth in subsections 104(b), 105(b) 
and 106(b), standards which would be difficult to meet given cur-
rent trapping technology. 
108 Criminal Penalties: 
(a) Intentional violation of the provisions of section 104 is a 
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misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than $500, or incar-
ceration in [ ] for a period of not less than six months, or 
both, for each violation. 
(b) Intentional violation of the provisions of section 105 is a 
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than $300, or incar-
ceration in [ ] for a period of not less than three months, or 
both, for each violation. 
(c) Intentional violation of the provisions of section 106 is a 
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than $100, or incar-
ceration in [ ] for a period of not less than one month, or 
both, for each violation. 
COMMENT: This section limits prosecution for criminal viola-
tions to intentional acts or omissions. It also establishes penalties 
of decreasing severity for the various animal classes. The actual 
amount of the fine or sentence is tailorable to the jurisdiction enact-
ing this section, but the penalties should be significant, and mini-
mum penalties should be set forth. 
109 Civil Damages, Civil Forfeitures, Equitable Relief, At-
torney's Fees: 
(a) In any civil action brought on behalf of an animal under the 
provisions of this Act, the Plaintiff shall have the burden of show-
ing that the violation complained of was the result of Defendant's 
failure to exercise the degree of care which would have been ex-
pected of a reasonable person in the Defendant's position. 
(b) Civil Damages: The measure of damages for civil violations 
of this Act will be the amount required to relieve the animal of 
its pain or suffering, including any expenses incurred by the state 
in impounding, caring for, and disposing of the animal. 
(c) Civil Forfeitures: Where the animal has died or been perma-
nently injured as a result of the violation of this Act, in addition 
to civil damages the Court shall direct the Defendant to pay a 
Civil Forfeiture of not less than $100 for each violation. 
(d) Equitable Relief: The Court may grant any and all forms of 
equitable relief, including, but not limited to, preliminary and 
permanent injunctions, where violations of this Act are threat-
ened. 
(e) Attorney's Fees and Costs: Where natural persons or legal 
entities other than the State or its political subdivisions bring 
actions on behalf of animals under this Act, as a part of any 
award the Court shall grant to such persons or entities reasonable 
attorney's fees together with the costs of suit incurred by such 
persons or entities. 
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COMMENT: This section sets forth a standard of negligence for 
civil violations of sections 104-106 (§ 109(a». It also provides civil 
relief designed to protect the animal by anticipating or stopping 
cruelty (§ 109( d», and designed to make the animal whole 
(§ 109(b». In those instances where permanent damage has been 
done to the animal, the section provides for civil forfeitures 
(§ 109(b». This subsection applies particularly to situations where 
the animal has been killed, thus making damages inappropriate. 
Finally, the section provides for the award of reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs to animal advocates (§ 109(e». This is a recognition 
that the plaintiffs will be animals, and thus unable to compensate 
their advocates. Such a section should enable interested attorneys 
to devote more time to advocacy for animals. 
110 Impounding Animals: 
When any duly appointed law enforcement officer, or officer 
appointed specifically to enforce this Act, observes animals which 
are being mistreated in violation of this Act by any person, in-
cluding their owner, and has probable cause to believe that if the 
animal is not removed further violations will occur, that officer 
may take charge of the animal, and after notifying the owner, if 
present, and providing him with a receipt, may remove the ani-
mal from the person's control. If the owner is not present the 
officer must leave a receipt at the owner's principal residence or 
place of business, if known. 
COMMENT: This section reflects a salutory modem trend in a 
number of states toward insuring protection of the animal first.188 
Quick removal of an abused animal from the violator's control is 
often essential to preventing further abuse. 
111 Lien for Expense: 
Any expense incurred in an impoundment of an animal under 
this Act becomes a lien on the animal impounded and must be 
discharged before the animal may be released from the officer's 
custody. If the animal is not claimed by its owner and all im-
poundment costs satisfied within seven days, it may be sold at 
public or private sale for adequate consideration to a person capa-
ble of providing care consistent with this Act. The proceeds of 
such a sale shall be applied first to discharge the lien, and any 
balance shall then be paid over to the owner. If no purchaser is 
found, the animal may be offered for adoption, or disposed of in 
a manner not inconsistent with this Act. In those situations where 
no buyer is found, or the consideration paid does not cover expen-
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ses, a civil action may be brought under sections 103 and 109 of 
this Act to recover damages. 
COMMENT: This section, taken with section 110, provides an 
effective means of recovering the expenses of animal control facili-
ties when they are forced to take charge of animals. 187 
112 Disposition of Fines and Civil Forfeitures: 
All criminal fines and civil forfeitures paid for violations of 
this Act shall be turned over to [appropriate State agency or 
quasi-public organization charged with enforcement of the ani-
mal protection laws] to be used to supplement the enforcement 
capability of that [department, agency, or organization]. 
COMMENT: This section seeks to overcome the traditional un-
derfunding of animal protection activities. All fines and forfeitures 
would go to furthering enforcement of the Act. 
113 Maintaining Public Records: 
(a) Any natural person or legal entity, including the State and 
charitable and educational institutions, who keeps animals pro-
tected under this Act for any reason, except solely as personal 
pets, or farm animals, must maintain a daily record of the follow-
ing information: 
(1) Number and type of animals retained; 
(2) Conditions under which the animals are kept, consist-
ing of a brief description of type and size of cages, provisions 
for sanitation, and frequency and nature of feeding; 
(3) Reason for retention of animals. In the case of animals 
kept for purposes of scientific research a brief description of 
the design and purpose of the experiment is required. 
(b) The information required by subsection (a) of this section 
shall be contained in a yearly record book. Such book must be 
retained for three years following the last day of the year for which 
it was kept. This book shall be available to any law enforcement 
officer for review, on the premises of the person or entity keeping 
animals, during normal business hours. 
(c) -Failure to maintain a record, or falsification of a record, 
required by this section is a misdemeanor punishable by: 
(1) For failure to maintain, a fine of $50 for each day omit-
ted, not to exceed a total of $1000. 
(2) For falsification, a fine of $200 for each entry falsified, 
not to exceed $3000. 
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COMMENT: This section is a response to perhaps the most diffi-
cult problem in protecting animals, discovering the cruelty. Ani-
mals are unable to voice complaints, and cruelty is rarely practiced 
in public. The section requires that people who use animals must 
maintain certain minimal information concerning the conditions 
under which the animals are kept. By requiring that this informa-
tion be available to law enforcement officers, cruel conditions may 
be more easily detected. Admittedly this section would require a fair 
amount of paperwork, but refinements of exactly what information 
is required might be worked out under regulations issued pursuant 
to section 114. It is important that those who keep animals recognize 
that they are undertaking a responsibility to the animals, and this 
section would reinforce that recognition of responsibility. This sec-
tion is also adaptable to a general licensing inspection program of 
the type suggested by the Committee for Humane Legislation. 
114 Regulations: 
The [Department charged with administration of this Act] 
shall have the power to issue regulations establishing standards 
and procedures necessary for the effective enforcement of this 
Act. 
COMMENT: This section gives the state agency charged with 
administration of this Act the authority to adapt specific standards 
and procedures to various types of animal use within the general 
provisions of the Act. Such regulations may be important, for in-
stance, to establish proper standards of care for specific animals 
under subsections 104(d), 105(d) and l06(d). 
115 Limitation of Actions by Time: 
All actions, civil or criminal, under this Act, must be com-
menced within three years of the date the alleged cruelty oc-
curred. For the purposes of this section, an action is commenced 
on the filing of the original complaint. 
COMMENT: This section establishes a time limitation on com-
mencement of actions. 
E. General Comments on the Proposed Model Act 
Obviously, the Act does not purport to solve all of the problems 
confronting animals today. Species depletion and animal popula-
tion control are only two of the specific problems which would not 
be reached under this Act. ISS A complete animal protection program 
requires statutes dealing with many areas of human -animal contact, 
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as well as effective administration, and effective enforcement. 189 At 
the heart of any animal protection plan, however, must be a clear 
legislative statement of the standard of care owed to animals, and 
the means available for enforcing that standard. In these days of 
financial crisis in state government, upgrading the administration 
and enforcement of animal protection laws may be extremely diffi-
cult. One response is to provide continuing revenue for those enforc-
ing the animal laws from licensing fees and fines. 190 Another ap-
proach, often adopted in the environmental enforcement area, has 
been to rely increasingly on interested individuals and .groups as 
"private attorney generals."191 Although concern was expressed, 
when such access was granted in the environmental enforcement 
area that spurious actions would clog the courts, there is now evi-
dence that these "citizen suit" provisions have not been abused. 192 
The Model Act proposed above is an attempt to combine these two 
approaches with a clearer statement of the standard of care that is 
owed to specific types of animals. As such, this Act should provide 
a focal point around which an effective animal protection plan can 
be constructed. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps because of the great human problems we face, the plight 
of animals often goes unnoticed. We are isolated from learning what 
really happens to animals. We do not see beakless chickens in tiny 
cages on factory farms allowed to do nothing but eat. Slaughter-
houses are removed from residential areas, and are avoided by the 
general public.193 Meat is attractively packaged and labeled in neu-
tral terms like "beef', "ham" or "mutton". Animals are portrayed 
in advertisements as anxious to taste good. We simply do not think 
about, and do not allow ourselves to be shown, how animals are 
really treated. In addition, we have retained our traditional con-
cepts of animals as inferior creatures, qualitatively different from 
ourselves. An example of this continuing prejudice is our use of the 
word "animal" as an expletive for the lowest, most depraved 
human. 194 
Perhaps worst of all, people who defend animals from exploitation 
are too often seen as fuzzy-thinking sentimentalists. One would 
hope that, given the choice of being sentimental or being cruel, most 
people would choose to be sentimental. I95 Modern scientific discov-
eries about animals require more sophisticated approaches than this 
"sentimental-cruel" dichotomy, however. Scientists, moralists, law-
yers, we must all now pause to consider just what animals are, and 
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what place they occupy in a world that is theirs as well as ours. This 
consideration is required by stronger reasons than sentimentality, 
or even self-interest. In a world which recognizes animals as qualita-
tively similar to man, such consideration is a moral obligation. 
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